The Erosion of Memory Consensus
The political and symbolic imaginary, the “memory consensus” regarding Georgia’s path toward Europe has come to an end. This consensus gained momentum following the “Rose Revolution” in 2003 and was built on the promise of modernizing Georgia and cutting ties with its Soviet past. Georgia’s pro-Western narrative has been systematically attacked and eroded by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party. This process began in 2014 when the GD coalition shifted from a relatively inclusive coalition to a unified right-wing force. Georgian Dream’s democratic backsliding is evident in the rise of ethnocentric nationalism, right-wing populism, social conservatism, anti-LGBTQ propaganda, and a broad spectrum of anti-democratic policies in education, the judiciary and elsewhere. GD is now an ally of contemporary Russia which wages its own cultural wars against the West.
The culmination of this switch came after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Georgian government has proved reluctant to distance itself from Moscow’s imperial policies. Part of Georgian Dream’s armory is the dismantling of a Georgian collective memory which supports Georgians’ centuries-old Western aspirations. Georgian Dream is deliberately manipulating historical themes and tropes deeply rooted in the Georgian people’s historical imagination. The idea is to impose a new “memory regime” (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2003) which justifies Georgian Dream’s own geopolitical aspirations. King Erekle II (1720–1798) and Ilia Chavchavadze (1837–1907), have in particular become targets of Georgian Dream’s attempts at historical manipulation.
For Georgians, King Erekle II of the eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (1762-1801), represents the symbolic and pragmatic turn toward Russia. He signed the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia in 1783, which made Georgia a protectorate of the Russian Empire. The treaty paved the way for the complete annexation of Georgian kingdoms and principalities by the empire in the 19th century. Erekle’s decision to ally with Russia is portrayed by more conservative historians as the proper choice – to align with an Orthodox Christian power in order to save Georgia from Persian and Ottoman threats from the south. In contrast, liberal circles emphasize the king’s repeated attempts to form alliances with European powers before signing the treaty with Russia. The debate over Erekle’s decision is reflected in a very famous poem in Georgia – Bedi Kartlisa (The Fate of Georgia) – written by Nikoloz Baratashvili in 1839, which underlines Erekle’s struggle over the dilemma between the independence of his kingdom and the security of his subjects. It is a poem every Georgian schoolchild is required to read. The choice Erekle makes in the poem is an important part of the history curriculum in Georgian schools, and a question that echoes today in the political debates about Georgia’s relationship with Russia.
King Erekle II of the eastern Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (1762–1801).Portrait from the digital collection of the National Archives of Georgia. Source.
Ilia Chavchavadze, a writer, journalist, lawyer, and public figure, is likewise, a national figure in Georgian historical imaginary. He is conventionally honored as the main representative of Georgian liberal thought and the founding father of modern Georgian nationalism in the second half of the 19th century. During the rise of ethnoreligious Georgian nationalism in the 1980s, Ilia Chavchavadze was canonized as Saint Ilia the Righteous by the Georgian Orthodox Church. Chavchavadze’s motto referring to “fatherland, language, and faith” as the central tenets of Georgianness has also become part of the current debate about Georgian identity and where Georgian belongs culturally and geographically. Georgian Dream attempts to use these two figures in ways that align with the ideological construct of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which emphasizes Orthodox Christianity, traditional values, and stands in contrast to Western liberalism.
Ilia Chavchavadze (1837–1907). Aleksandre Roinishvili’s photo. From the digital collection of the National Archives of Georgia. Source.
Shaping Georgia’s Pro-Western Identity
The narrative of Georgia’s European heritage goes back to the pre-Soviet period. Over the past two centuries, the historical and collective memory of Georgians has been shaped by the rule of Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and periods of Georgian independence, such as the First Republic (1918–1921) and modern Georgia, which regained its independence in 1991.
Within the Tsarist context, Georgians largely had to conform to the empire’s narrative of a civilizational mission. Russia was seen as a carrier of superior European ideas. But, simultaneously, in the second half of the 19th century, a group of prominent cultural and public figures led by Ilia Chavchavadze played a pivotal role in reviving the Georgian language, cultural identity, and a sense of shared national history. They founded and led public, cultural, and educational organizations such as the “Society for the Spreading of Literacy Among Georgians,” the “Historical-Ethnographical Society of Georgia,” and the “Dramatic Society.” Their overarching national project was aligned with broader trends of cultural nationalism among other subjects in multi-ethnic empires in Central and Eastern Europe (Hroch, 1985).
Ilia Chavchavadze distinguished between the extreme Russian and European understandings of liberalism and conservatism. For Chavchavadze, there was a moderate European path, where conservatism and liberalism coexisted. He wanted to revive a weakened and declining national identity in Georgia. He referenced the Czech experience, where leaders restored national identity by studying and revitalizing their language and heroic past. He believed Georgia’s youth should be animated by the same ideas as in Europe in order to promote the modern Georgian nation’s mission.
Noe Zhordania (1869-1953), the leader of the short-lived “First Republic” (1918-1921) ruled by the Georgian Social Democrats, prioritized the right to self-determination for nations (Jones 2005). As early as 1918, he outlined the dichotomy between Europe and European Georgia on the one hand, and Russia on the other. From a Marxist perspective, he framed the struggle for national independence as a fight for liberation against external conquerors, emphasizing the people’s resistance against the dual oppression of the feudal class and the Bolshevik Russian Empire (Zhordania 2018). Zhordania believed that during his time, Georgia and Russia were moving in different directions. Georgia was on a path toward Europe, while Russia was heading toward Asia. If Bolsheviks were to enter and take control of Georgian society, it would result in the permanent loss of a free and democratic Georgia, cutting its ties with Europe forever.
Noe Zhordania (1869-1953). Photograph from the Online platform “100 Years of Georgia’s First Democratic Republic”.
The Soviet modernization project was an all-encompassing effort focused on rapid industrialization, collectivization, and technological advancement. Soviet science prioritized fields like physics, engineering, and later space exploration, often drawing on Western scientific achievements. The Bolsheviks aimed to reshape social and political realities and create a new socialist citizen by re-educating people ideologically, culturally, and morally (Kotkin 1995).
Soviet modernization was closely tied to the promotion of a multi-ethnic socialist state, often referred to as an “affirmative action empire” (Martin 2001). This approach aimed to facilitate the cultural advancement of “backward” ethno-linguistic groups that lacked key markers of national identity, such as schools in their native languages, historiography, and cultural institutions like theaters and operas.
Bolshevik ideologists conceptualized a primordial understanding of nationhood and belonging to a national territory that did not contradict integration into a larger ethno-federal state. The Soviet notion of self-determination did not imply political independence. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was represented as a place of “brotherhood” and “friendship” of peoples. Therefore, the notion of Georgia’s political independence in the Soviet era remained peripheral, invisible in the public sphere.
This fundamental restructuring was driven by an imperial mechanism of coercion, repression, terror, mass atrocities, and purges targeting political rivals and opponents. Any signs of national independence, such as the 1924 Georgian uprising against Soviet rule, were brutally crushed. As in the Tsarist period, the imperial core claimed the role of a civilizing force. The Soviet’s declared goals of culturally advancing “backward” nationalities and guaranteeing equality for all were ultimately replaced by a hierarchical vision of progress that favored Russian cultural and political dominance (Hirsh 2005).
As the Soviet Union began to crumble, the First Republic became the symbolic foundation of a new national narrative of independence. Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993), a former dissident and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, as well as the first president of the emerging independent country, reinforced the memory of this first Georgian nation-state. The declaration of independence of Georgia on 9 April 1991 was framed as a “restoration,” emphasizing the legal connections with the first republic and its legacy. Gamsakhurdia stated that “Georgia declared its independence in 1918, and it is still legitimate,” asserting that there was no need for a new declaration. He demanded from Russia’s leadership to officially acknowledge illegal occupation of Georgia throughout the Soviet period.
Georgians’ enduring cultural nationalism laid the groundwork for the eventual pro-Western orientation, which emerged once more when Georgia established its independence in 1991. Since then, the concept of sovereignty has been primarily framed in opposition to Russian imperial rule and as Georgia’s historical, civilizational, and political belonging to the West. The post-Soviet Georgian historical narrative has centered on themes such as national independence, sovereignty, Georgia’s links to ancient civilizations and the Greco-Roman world, its Christian heritage, and its relationship with the West, while the seventy years of Communist rule are denounced as a time of Soviet occupation which took Georgia away from the West. This period also witnessed the rise of ethnoreligious nationalism, which led to the sacralization of a national past.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993). Photograph from the Official Website of the Administration of the President of Georgia.
After the bloody coup and overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in January 1992, former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze returned from Moscow to assume leadership of the country. His tenure (1992-2003) was marked by civil unrest, ethno-political conflict in the Abkhazia region, and Georgia’s incorporation into the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The country faced economic collapse, and Russian influence persisted in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali.
Shevardnadze eventually made a decisive push for NATO membership, marking a pivotal shift in Georgia’s geopolitical orientation. His pro-Western policies somewhat echoed the dilemma faced by Erekle II. Shevardnadze saw alignment with the West as a pragmatic response to internal divisions, economic decline, and Russian threats, seeking to secure Georgia’s sovereignty and stability. His efforts toward Western integration were significantly influenced by young reformist politicians in his administration, such as Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania. During his presidency, Georgia also became a member of the Council of Europe. However, increasing corruption, rising crime, and continued economic decline hindered real progress toward NATO membership (Cornell 2001). Growing public dissatisfaction and a rigged election triggered mass protests. Young reformers who had previously been part of Shevardnadze’s government led the Rose Revolution in November 2003, forcing Shevardnadze to resign.
Eduard Shevardandze (1928-2014). Photograph from the Official Website of the Administration of the President of Georgia.
Following the Rose Revolution in 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration and the post-revolutionary political elite committed to building a new state, broke away from the Soviet legacy, implementing comprehensive reforms across all sectors (education, social care, police, military, etc.), and fostered a “mental revolution” alongside political transformation. Integration into Western institutions, particularly NATO and the EU, was declared as a major objective. Consequently, the notion of Georgia as an integral part of European and broader Western civilization became central to the national narrative. The new national memory consensus emphasized Georgia’s fundamental difference from Russia.
In 2010, a “fact-finding commission” was established, led by Vasil Rukhadze, to uncover “historical truths” about the Georgian-Russian relationship, investigating crimes committed by occupation regimes since 1801. In a speech with French President Nicolas Sarkozy at Tbilisi’s Freedom Square on October 7, 2011, Saakashvili reinforced this narrative, linking Georgia to a European identity and future. He reaffirmed that Georgians have long considered themselves part of Europe, referring to the Christian faith, alliances with the Byzantine Empire and democratic ideas.
Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia (2004-2012). Photograph from the Official Website of the Administration of the President of Georgia.
The narrative of an epic confrontation between a small democratic Georgia and a destructive Russian empire, as a battle between David and Goliath, became actualized and reinforced in August 2008. Following escalating clashes between Georgian troops and Ossetian militants in the Kremlin-backed South Ossetia/Tskhinvali breakaway region, the Russian army invaded Georgia. Putin asserted that his goal was to prevent any attempts to drag Russia out of the Caucasus, likely serving as a warning to those supporting NATO’s expansion into former Soviet territories. The war lasted five days and resulted in the mass expulsion of ethnic Georgians from the conflict zone, and Russia’s subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26, 2008. Since then, Russia has “legalized” its military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali regions which are legally considered Russian-occupied territories by the government of Georgia and the international community.
Toward Authoritarianism
The Georgian Dream coalition, founded by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, won the 2012 parliamentary elections, ending nearly a decade-long rule by President Saakashvili’s United National Movement. The erosion of the pro-European political consensus paralleled Georgian Dream’s shift to right-wing politics as it dispensed with its more liberal coalition partners. This paradigm rupture is akin to Max Weber’s (1972) notion of “elective affinity” which describes a natural alignment between ideas, values, social groups, and institutions. Weber argued that elective affinities arise when specific cultural values and social structures converge and mutually reinforce one another. For instance, the Protestant ethic, characterized by its focus on hard work and frugality, demonstrates an elective affinity with the capitalist spirit, which prioritizes economic success and accumulation. He emphasized that these affinities are shaped by particular historical contexts.
The notion of affinity helps us understand why and how the Georgian Dream (GD) aligns with similar regimes elsewhere and particularly with Putin’s Russia. The ruling party continues to assert it will not divert from the European path, but yet prioritizes relations with the illiberal parts of Europe, most notably Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. However, the experiences of being part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union have created cultural and structural conditions that make it easier for GD to align more closely with Russia.
Georgia’s government and its proxy forces employ rhetoric which incorporates many of the ideological elements of the Russian World into its own historical propaganda. Despite the existential threat posed by Putin’s Russia, which occupies Abkhazia and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali regions, the paradox of Georgian Dream’s “European” policy is its deconstruction of positive Western symbolism. Its approach in effect challenges the declared trajectory towards Europe and aligns with its former imperial power.
The ruling establishment’s narrative sees Georgian identity as inherently opposed to liberal interpretations of historical progress – such as secularization, the decline of patriarchalism and the promotion of LGBTQ rights. This discourse is used by the GD party to frame illiberal legislative initiatives and amplify its increasingly anti-Western image. Georgian Dream (GD) posits the existence of a “global war party” defined as a Western coalition pushing Georgia into the Russia-Ukraine war. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and other high-ranking GD members link American, European, and Ukrainian elites to local Georgian opposition groups as part of a demonization of harmful Western values.
Ivanishvili, in his speeches since April 2024 describes the “global war party” as openly dominating American and European administrations. He blamed the West for pushing Georgia into conflict with Russia in 2008 and argued it was now leading Ukraine into a devastating war (Castillo, 2024). As the parliamentary elections in October 2024 approach, the West is accused of supporting the “radical opposition” and their allied NGOs in plotting a coup in Georgia. The authoritarian grip on power is presented as a defense of Georgia’s sovereignty against the West.
Bidzina Ivanishvili. Photograph from the Website: intepressnews.ge
The introduction of the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” in May 2024—commonly referred to as the “Foreign Agents Law” or the “Russian Law” due to its similarity to Putin’s legal instruments used to crush democratic opposition and dissent in Russia—has served as a wake-up call for many in Georgia and among Western supporters. The law requires media, non-commercial, and nongovernmental organizations to register as foreign influenced if they receive over 20% of their funding from abroad. Foreign influences, in fact means Western influences. The law allows the collection of sensitive personal data, including political views, ethnic identity, religious beliefs, and sexual orientation.
In September 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed a new law on “Of Family Values and Protection of Minors.” This law covers various important areas such as marriage, adoption, foster care for minors, medical procedures related to gender transition, gender identification on official documents, education and information dissemination, public demonstrations, labor relations, and the recognition of biological sexual identity. The legislation names May 17 as a day dedicated to honor the sanctity of the family and respect for parents (Georgia Today, September 13, 2024).
These legal initiatives of the Georgian Dream (GD) party government signal Georgia’s turn towards Russia’s orbit and its abandonment of the liberal “Western” path. The government’s new direction increasingly embraces authoritarianism and right-wing populist politics. The GD government uses various far-right groups as proxies to influence political processes and suppress civil society. These groups such as the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (APG), “Alt-Info,” and “Solidarity for Peace” claim to represent the entire Georgian people in a struggle against real or imagined “enemies.” These enemies include LGBTQ+ communities, immigrants from Asia (including Iran, Turkey, and China), and most importantly, the West, which is blamed for epitomizing these and other perceived sins.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Alt-Info started to push for closer ties with Russia, It argued that normalizing relations with Moscow would better ensure the country’s security than its current pro-Western alignment. Alt-Info supports a Russian victory in the war against Ukraine. In July 2021, members of Georgian Dream (GD) formed the parliamentary group “People’s Power,” which later transformed into a political party. Their attempt to position themselves as a separate entity from GD was futile in the public’s eyes. However, in their open and harsh criticism of the EU, one could easily see how they projected Ivanishvili’s and GD’s still latent but increasingly bold disengagement from the West.
The introduction of the so-called “Foreign Agent Law” intensified the government’s anti-Western rhetoric, but other, pro-Russian players with bolder messages are attempting to strengthen their positions in Georgia’s political landscape. They are contributing to the radical fragmentation of society over the issue of Georgia’s Western aspirations. In August 2024, the newly emerged pro-Russian “Solidarity for Peace” party urged the Russian President and the Georgian Prime Minister to swiftly restore diplomatic ties with Russia. The party calls for unity between the two nations “without any preconditions” to counter the West, claiming the latter aims to “destroy” Russian civilization and push Georgia toward war while the small Caucasian nation struggles to survive. In this rhetoric, a parallel is made with the 1783 treaty between Eastern Georgia and Russia, which established a similar unified economic, cultural, and military-political space to ensure peace and prosperity for both countries (Civil.ge, August 5, 2024).
A Populist Cultural Backlash
How is the Georgian Dream government, along with its proxies, challenging the memory and political consensus that have long been the bedrock of Georgia’s historical imagination? What mechanisms and actors are driving this new politics of memory? Illiberal political elites elsewhere often resort to cultural themes in their rhetoric as a way to gain or retain governmental power by invoking popular sovereignty as a core principle (Arato and Cohen 2021). Populists claim that they represent a homogeneous and “pure people” (Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004). They design a friend-enemy dichotomy between the people and the “other” which can include internal or external adversaries such as political rivals, immigrants, the LGBTQ community, or Western-funded critical NGOs.
The current Georgian political elite uses culture as a tool to demonize Western funded civil society and to strengthen their hold on power by validating the deliberate destruction of an already weak democracy. The Georgian Dream’s rhetoric of “sovereignty” which at first glance seems paradoxical due to its promotion of easing tensions with Russia aligns with the Soviet imperial model. On the one hand, Georgian Dream acknowledges that Russia is an occupying force in Georgian territories. On the other hand, the policies and rhetoric of GD members reveal how the legacy of imperial core-periphery power relations is being revived through the imitation of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) and features of its ideology. The instrumentalization of collective sentiments about traditions and religion opens space for the projection of soft power from Moscow.
The Instrumentalization of King Erekle II
The current regime capitalizes on Georgia’s complex mnemonic heritage, which has waxed and waned through different historical contexts in Tsarist, Soviet and Post-Soviet periods. Enduring tropes of historical events and figures central to collective memory provide ready-made constructs that can be infused with contemporary political meanings. The GD government and its proxies selectively invoke or “defend” historical figures distinguished by supposedly contradictory political choices or those easily exploitable for political purposes due to their profound impact on the nation’s history. King Erekle II and Ilia Chavchavadze are ideal historical figures for manipulation as they both have such tremendous historical credibility.
King Erekle II, who was instrumental in establishing permanent ties with Russia by making his country a protectorate of the Empire is probably the most useful historical figure for official “memory specialists.” He is a historical icon “used and abused” from a repertoire of Georgian symbolic imaginary to justify geopolitical and ideological goals. The Soviet government celebrated “Russian-Georgian friendship” anniversaries based on the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783. The image of Russia as a “big brother” which saved Georgians from the Persian and Ottoman yoke was actively cultivated in the Soviet politics of memory. Soviet historians interpreted Erekle’s decision as a decisive move that ultimately brought about the unification of historical Georgian lands under the Russian Empire and later within the Soviet republic. The symbolic trope and historical argumentation have been repeatedly played out in the rhetoric of some contemporary anti-liberal Georgian historians, and this perspective is especially suitable for the current ruling party’s pro-Russian rhetoric.
Illustrations of hijacking and instrumentalizing certain tropes around historical figures, such as Erekle II, contribute to pro-Russian and Soviet sentiments while simultaneously fostering a sense of national patriotism—all in an effort to counter Western aspirations. In January 2023, for example, the far-right group Alt-Info prevented the Georgian professor of literature and government critic Levan Berdzenishvili from delivering a lecture at the Euroclub in Kvareli, eastern Georgia. Ultra-conservative groups and the ruling Georgian Dream party targeted Berdzenishvili after he criticized Erekle II for signing the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia in 1783. In May 2022, Berdzenishvili argued that Erekle II should be labeled a “traitor” for ceding Eastern Georgia’s sovereignty to Russia, drawing parallels to the current Georgian government’s policies, which critics claim do not support Ukraine and quietly align with Russia. Alt-Info accused Berdzenishvili of being a “Western agent” (Kincha, 2024).
In the summer of 2024, the NGO “Solidarity for Peace” launched a brochure by historian Nukri Shoshiasvhili at a conference on Georgian-Russian relations. Titled Georgia in the 18th Century – Erekle II, the brochure addressed the legacy of King Erekle II. According to Shoshiasvhili, the brochure was inspired by recent accusations labeling Erekle a traitor, marking a rupture in Georgian historical memory. Merab Chikashvili, a representative of “Solidarity for Peace,” argued that the brochure countered efforts to distort Erekle’s legacy. It examines Erekle’s political decisions, which the author argues saved Georgia, and outlines three primary goals of the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk: first, it defended Georgian identity, second, it preserved territorial integrity, and third, it ensured geopolitical security. While Erekle did not fully achieve these goals, Shoshiasvhili claims his policies laid the groundwork for their eventual realization. Thanks to this historical choice, Georgia became more secure, including demographic growth. In 1878, Georgian territorial integrity was restored following the Russo-Turkish War, with Adjara, formerly an Ottoman territory, becoming part of Georgia. This unification of the Georgian ethnos within a single space strengthened Georgian cultural identity, including the Georgian language. Thus, Erekle’s goals were finally achieved under Russia’s direction.
The audience, primarily right-wing and conservative, suggested the brochure should be distributed to students as a teaching resource. Participants acknowledged that Erekle’s policies led to Georgia’s incorporation into the Russian Empire, though they seemed to view this as a positive development, reinforcing the Soviet narrative of Georgian-Russian friendship. Shoshiasvhili concluded that illusions and misjudging history led to wars and territorial losses for Georgia and advocated for more pragmatic thinking in Georgian society. The message seemed to be that the concept of national independence was an illusion, crafted by the “global war party” to deceive the Georgian public. The participants suggested that the brochure was an attempt to awaken Georgian society and underline the value of the past for the present (Solidarity for Peace, 2024).
In August 2024, Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze proposed erecting a monument to King Erekle II in Tbilisi. He described it as a duty to honor Georgia’s history and the national heroes who dedicated their lives to preserving the “spiritual and national identity” of the Georgian people. Pro-Western opposition parties slammed the initiative, viewing it as a symbolic gesture intended to signal alignment with Russia against the West. Former President Mikheil Saakashvili argued that Georgian Dream (GD) is in the process of surrendering the country to Russia, and this move was a deliberate signal ahead of the parliamentary elections in October 2024.
It is telling, too, that Georgian Dream leaders avoid mentioning the Battle of Aspindza (April 20, 1770), where King Erekle II was abandoned by Russian General Gotlib Totleben, who was supposed to join him in a decisive fight against the Ottomans in southern Georgia. In the 1760s, Erekle and his father, Teimuraz II (1680-1762), sought a Russian alliance against the Ottoman Empire and Persia. During the 1769 Russo-Turkish War, Empress Catherine sent Totleben with 1,200 men to aid Georgians. Disagreements over military strategy between Erekle II and Totleben led the Russian general to withdraw unexpectedly on April 19, leaving Erekle to face the Ottomans alone. Although Erekle triumphed, Totleben’s withdrawal became a symbol of Russia’s unreliability.
Before Georgian Dream’s complete illiberal turn, party leaders like Giorgi Kadagishvili acknowledged Russia’s betrayal during the 300th anniversary of King Erekle II’s birth (Radio Tavisupleba, August 24, 2024). However, this historical episode is now conspicuously absent from their narrative. Instead, the Soviet-era narrative of Georgian-Russian friendship, with Erekle’s role in fostering these so-called Russian Georgian “brotherly” ties, better fits Georgian Dream’s current political agenda.
The Instrumentalization of Ilia Chavchavadze
Political leaders are sometimes compared to historical figures. For example, Saakashvili placed Ilia Chavchavadze’s portrait in the meeting hall of the newly built presidential palace, which opened in 2009, a symbol of the new Georgia. This act drew a parallel between Saakashvili and Chavchavadze’s own liberal legacy. In 2012, Bidzina Ivanishvili, Saakashvili’s political opponent, presented Ilia Chavchavadze as his role model when he was awarded a medal named in Chavchacadze’s honor. He declared it was time to fulfill the dream of the “Father of the Nation,” who dedicated his entire life to thinking about and working for the well-being of the Georgian people and the country (NewPosts, November 8, 2012).
In 2016, Ivanishvili released a public letter highlighting the sharp contrast between the government of Saakashvili’s National Movement Party and Georgian Dream. He characterized the Saakashvili era as one of oppression and increasing authoritarianism, contrasting it with the Georgian Dream government, which he claimed was distinguished by democratic transformation. In his letter, Ivanishvili emphasized that “a return to authoritarianism would not only be a political setback but also a tragedy for the nation’s mentality, as authoritarianism thrives on violence and suppresses political, religious, and social diversity. Georgia’s path to development and prosperity lies in freedom, democracy, and tolerance. These values naturally shape aspirations toward EU and NATO integration, which are strategic priorities of foreign policy. This course reflects the free choice of citizens, grounded in historical and cultural ties with the West, as repeatedly confirmed by surveys and the plebiscite (Tabula, May 30, 2016,a). Manana Kobakhidze, a member of parliament, praised the letter and compared it to the publicist legacy of Ilia Chavchavadze, drawing parallels between the two figures (Tabula, May 30, 2016,b).
During his speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest on April 25, 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze called for the protection of traditional values and warned against perceived threats such as LGBT “propaganda” and “uncontrolled migration.” Kobakhidze claimed that liberal ideology in Europe and the U.S posed real danger to Georgia. He slammed liberals in Georgia for endangering Christianity, national identity, and state sovereignty, which he argued rested on the three pillars of “fatherland, language, faith,” a concept attributed to Ilia Chavchavadze. Kobakhidze condemned Georgian liberals for replacing “faith” with “unity” in this list of markers of Georgian national identity. He was referring to the youth protests on April 19, 2024, against the reintroduction of the foreign agent law, where demonstrators modified Chavchavadze’s triad to create a more inclusive formula for Georgia’s multi-religious society (Civil.ge, April 25, 2024) by substituting the word “faith” with “unity.” In his populist speech, PM Kobakhidze appropriated a sacralized image of Chavchavadze, one which encouraged an ethno-religious nationalism and demonstrated the growing illiberal shift of the ruling Georgian Dream party.
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. April 25, 2024. Photograph from the Official Website of the Government of Georgia.
At a regional event for Georgian Dream’s election campaign in Telavi, Kakheti, on September 28, 2024, Bidzina Ivanishvili compared the National Movement party and the opposition to a “political sarcoma” that Georgian society must excise. To emphasize his point, he invoked a historical reference, citing “Fatherland, Language, Faith”—three divine gifts bestowed upon Georgia by Ilia Chavchavadze, “a son of the Kakheti region” who dedicated his life to the nation’s welfare during difficult times. According to Ivanishvili, as in Ilia’s time, Georgians faced a similar challenge from what he called the enemies of Georgian traditions, history, culture, and faith—Saakashvili’s National Movement Party.
Ivanishvili drew a comparison between the opposition and Aga Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar Dynasty of Iran (1742–1797), who, Ivanishvili claimed, devastated the Kakheti region and uprooted vineyards (However, historically, Aga Mohammad Khan captured and destroyed Tbilisi but did not invade Kakheti). The key point Ivanishvili was making was the comparison between foreign invaders and the National Movement Party, accusing them of destroying Georgia’s winemaking economy—an essential element of Georgian cultural identity. He urged Georgian Dream to secure a constitutional majority in the upcoming elections to prevent the destructive opposition from regaining power (Interpressnews, September 28, 2024).
Conclusion: Rewriting the Past?
As in Europe and the US, contemporary Georgia’s political landscape also accommodates far-right populist parties and movements. Following the schism with the liberal and pro-Western parties of the GD coalition in 2014, illiberal rhetoric gradually and steadily permeated political discourse in Georgia. Today, GD appears to have made it clear that it is abandoning Georgia’s Western aspirations, opting for a radical paradigm shift that steers the country away from its path toward the West. In this positioning as the sole defender of Georgian culture and “sovereignty,” Bidzina Ivanishvili’s GD continues to create or support proxy radical right-wing forces [such as Alt-Info].
The legal initiatives such as the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” (May 2024), mirrors Kremlin tactics to suppress democratic dissent, and have had significant legal, political, and social repercussions. However, beyond this immediate and profound rupture, we are witnessing a deeper symbolic shift aimed at transforming the very fabric of Georgia’s historical imaginary of its belonging to Europe. These modifications of Georgian history are attempts to dissolve the prevailing historical narrative that links Georgia’s democratic aspirations to the West and promote opposition to Russian authoritarianism and imperialism. The historical battlefield now serves as a platform where authoritarian logic unfolds in a form already familiar in Russia, Hungary and elsewhere in Europe.
Conservative values and history have been heavily instrumentalized to strengthen political affinity with other authoritarian regimes. Georgian political elites, beyond their general affinity with authoritarianism, are increasingly adopting symbolic repertoires intrinsic to Kremlin cultural and identity politics. These themes emphasize Orthodox Christianity, traditional family values, and an anti-LGBTQ stance which together have fostered a natural association with the ideological construct of the “Russian World.”
This new memory regime, promoted by the GD government, seeks to dismantle the post-2003 consensus by exploiting Georgia’s complex mnemonic heritage. From the Tsarist era to the Soviet period, Georgians had to navigate a challenging landscape of imperial domination and the struggle for self-determination. During these times, they were often compelled to internalize the civilizational mission of the imperial metropolis, often sidelining their aspirations for independence. The sense of nationhood and distinct identity coexisted with being part of an ethno-federal state, such as the Soviet Union. GD’s representations of sovereignty and friendship with Russia may resonate with this Soviet mindset.
The past is now being weaponized for political purposes through the instrumentalization and manipulation of historical figures, such as Erekle II and Ilia Chavchavadze. By selectively “using and abusing” collective memory of historical characters and events, the government is ultimately weakening the foundational pro-European consensus. Historical themes and figures become “empty signifiers,” filled with whatever content suits the purposes of the political elite.
Malkhaz Toria (Ph.D. 2009) is an Associate Professor of history and the director of the Memory Studies Center in the Caucasus at Ilia State University (Tbilisi, Georgia). He is also a doctoral candidate in sociology at the New School for Social Research (NYC, The USA). His research interests focus on theories of history and the epistemology of historical knowledge; Tsarist and Soviet imperial legacies and the politics of identity, belonging, and boundary-making in contemporary Georgia; politics of memory and dealing with the totalitarian past in post-Soviet societies; modern museology and memorial culture; the instrumentalization of history and politics of exclusion and ethnic cleansing in Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali. He has held fellowships (Fulbright, DAAD, OSF, etc.) at the New School for Social Research, Central European University (CEU), Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL), Humboldt University of Berlin, University of California, Berkeley, the Harriman Institute of Columbia University and the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University.
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Georgia's Turn Toward Illiberalism and the “Uses and Abuses” of History