The last few weeks have born numerous demonstrations and statements across Europe against the threat of (neo)fascism. In January, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sànchez warned of the rise of authoritarian forces and asserted—correctly—that “you don’t need to be progressive, you just need to be a democrat” to stand up for parliamentary democracy. On February 2, hundreds of thousands took to the streets in Germany to protest the breaking of the “firewall” by the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party, which previously isolated the far-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The two parties collaborated with the AfD in a vote on January 29 regarding the conditions for asylum in the country.
These two episodes reflect the resolve of many Europeans to combat the return of fascism. And yet they also speak to how fascism takes hold. Only a united front holds authoritarianism at bay, and the collaboration with the AfD exemplifies how fascists entangle less radical political parties with their project. Fascists seize power precisely through this process of co-opting like-minded parties and individuals, who excuse the extremes of far-Right parties because they find commonality among their visions for society. Support granted on the basis of specific goals and policies normalizes these (neo)fascists and grows their base in parliamentary politics, which they ultimately use to undermine and even overturn democratic institutions.
It is noteworthy that the month during which these events occurred marked the 100th anniversary of Mussolini’s declaration of the Fascist dictatorship on January 3, 1925. When reflecting on Mussolini’s consolidation of power, it becomes clear that it would not have been possible without those who collaborated with the regime due to coercion, opportunity, and shared agendas for Italy. These supporters came from a range of sociopolitical circles in Italy who were not as radical as Fascists of the first hour but were nonetheless entangled in the politics of the regime.
Fascism is often referred to as a unique, singular phenomenon, but setting it aside as something entirely distinct neglects that fascism exists on a fluid political spectrum; Fascists participated and shaped their ideology within a political discourse that predated their movement. Fascist ideology—while unique in its combination of ideas and its unambiguous embrace of violence—drew on a variety of ideas and addressed several concerns shared by other sociopolitical circles.
Many conservatives and liberals shared Fascism’s sense of ultranationalism, hierarchical vision for society, and defense of traditions. Above all, individuals from these sociopolitical circles resonated with Fascists’ determination to resist communism and even less radical positions on the Left by any means, including dictatorship and brutal violence. These values appealed to many Catholics, too, among the conservative and authoritarian faction dominant in the Vatican hierarchy during the 1920s and ‘30s.
When the first iteration of what would later become the Fascist Party took form in 1919, many Italian veterans of the First World War were drawn to its ultranationalism and Mussolini’s image as “a man of action.” The Italian military endured over three years of combat in the Alps, suffering over half a million deaths and nearly a million wounded. Despite the Italian contribution to the Allied victory, Italian politicians were marginalized in the peace talks and Italy did not receive the territorial gains promised by the British and French for fighting on the Allied side. So began the myth of the “mutilated victory,” fueling nationalism through a narrative of being victimized by other nations. Italy’s ruling liberal politicians were seen as increasingly inadequate, a sharp contrast to the “strong man” seen in Mussolini, who would reclaim the peninsula’s ancient glory and restore Italy to a leading role among the “Great Powers.”
Support for the Fascists grew as Mussolini and his Blackshirts positioned themselves in opposition to what many Italians believed an existential threat: the growth of communism in Italy. Many Europeans feared that the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia would spread throughout the continent, a fear which seemed validated by the attempted socialist revolutions in Germany and Hungary in 1919. Italy, too, underwent two years of social strife in 1919 and 1920, referred to as the “biennio rosso,” the “red years,” characterized by strikes, factory occupations, and demands for workers to have more say in organizing the economy. Fascist squads brutally suppressed these strikes. Despite the exaggeration of communism’s power in Italy, fear of Bolshevism earned Fascists the support of the Italian agricultural and industrial elite, as well as members of the Italian middle class. These new sources of support among the middle and upper classes brought financial support and aligned influential members of Italian society with the Fascist movement.
The sense that Italy’s leading politicians had both failed to advocate for their country after WWI and were unable to maintain order domestically spread disillusionment with the political system. The parliamentary order was perceived as weak and bogged down with procedure and debate.
Italy’s prime minister, Giovanni Giolitti, sought to exploit the growing popularity of the National Fascist Party (PNF) by inviting the party into the national list for the 1921 election. Giolitti adopted a political strategy common to Italian politics called trasformismo, by which parties outside the political status quo would be invited into the ruling coalition and thus “tamed.” While intended to use the PNF to strengthen the state, in practice, it legitimized the Fascist Party as a political party and gave them a greater platform to spread their message.
Opposition to socialism, and the belief that Fascism could bolster the enfeebled state, compelled many leading liberals to sympathize with the movement as well. This position is revealed in Corriere della Sera, the largest national newspaper in Italy at the time, which reflected the views of Italy’s industrial elite. The delusion that Fascism could be tamed and exploited by conservatives led to support in the pages of Corriere della Sera, including backing the nationalist list that included Fascist candidates. Although the directors of the paper later opposed the regime and lost control of the periodical as a result, the support initially given aided the transition to Fascist Italy.
The state’s inaction against Fascist violence encouraged Mussolini and his supporters. On October 27, Fascists launched the infamous March on Rome, during which thousands of supporters descended on the city and occupied provincial government offices to demand Mussolini be appointed prime minister. King Victor Emanuel III rejected using the army to suppress the Fascist uprising, citing fears that it would provoke a civil war. The fear was not completely unfounded, but it is worth noting that Victor Emanuel sympathized with Mussolini’s suppression of labor strife and his ambitions to make Italy into a Great Power. The king’s support amounted to the established authorities welcoming Mussolini into power, and placed state power behind the Fascists rather than branding the Fascists as enemies of the state for their insurrectionary actions. In a process that Hitler would later copy, Fascists employed violence and exploited parliamentary politics for what was inherently an anti-democratic and authoritarian movement.
In addition to infiltrating state institutions, Mussolini launched a campaign to woo Pius XI (pope 1922–39). As the dominant religion in Italy, the Catholic Church was one of the most influential seats of authority in the country. The pope and the Duce had common concerns and priorities, both deeming liberal democracy and socialism incompatible with their visions for society. Communism stood out to Pius XI as threatening European civilization and the Church itself, due to the USSR’s professed egalitarianism, rejection of private property, and attacks on religion.
Mussolini, by contrast, promised to defend Italian traditions and restore the authority of the Church in Italy. The Catholic Church led by Pius XI prioritized the “reconquest” of “de-Christianized countries.” Italian unification had proceeded at the cost of the pope’s political realm, the Papal States, and the unified state had marginalized the Vatican politically and in education. The belief that Mussolini could further the goals of the Church and the fear that resistance would result in further repression of the Church in Italy encouraged Pius XI to turn a blind eye to Fascist violence. The pope thus withdrew support from the Christian-democratic Italian People’s Party and extended it to the PNF instead. More liberal-minded Catholics remained opposed to Fascism (many of whom lived in exile for its regime, such as Don Luigi Sturzo).
As Mussolini garnered supporters, Fascists manipulated the existing legal system, passed new laws, and institutionalized Fascist organizations. In 1923, the Acerbo Law—passed with the aid of armed Blackshirts in the Chamber of Deputies—declared that the party which obtained the largest shares of the vote (and a minimum of only 25%) would gain two-thirds of the seats in parliament, further eroding the ability for political opposition to form. Mussolini’s declaration of the dictatorship in 1925 finalized the repression of political opposition following assassination attempts on Mussolini and the Matteotti crisis, in which Fascist thugs kidnapped and brutally murdered socialist politician Giacomo Matteotti in June 1924. The crisis threatened to unseat Mussolini as more moderate liberals abandoned the regime. Nonetheless, the continued support of key figures (including the king and the pope) emboldened Mussolini to declare his dictatorship.
Violence remained an ever-present threat for opponents of the regime. But, alongside the suppression of opponents, incentives enticed those who shared Fascist values but remained leery of its extremes. Writers, academics, and artists were offered prestigious positions and contracts for participating. Politicians from rival political parties with overlapping values were granted roles in state administration as their parties merged with the Fascist Party. The Lateran Pacts in 1929 demonstrated the ability of the regime and Vatican to collaborate. Although tensions between the Vatican and the regime persisted, the public collaboration between the two did much to legitimize the regime for millions of Italians, helping to form the unstable and often shallow consensus that characterized Italy throughout these years (to the extent that one can talk of consent in a regime built on coercion).
Many Italians were truly and outright Fascists. Yet others continued to resist, or aligned with the regime but did not consider themselves Fascists. The persistent threat of violence and the mandatory enrollment into the Partito nazionale fascista provoked the joke that the PNF stood for Per necessità della famiglia (For Necessity of Family), as joining the PNF was a means to gain access to resources, education, and work. It is thus difficult to assess political sentiments.
But one did not need to agree with every aspect of the regime to support it. While the PNF was often unpopular and seen as a source of violence and corruption, Mussolini himself and the “big ideas” of fascism enjoyed widespread popularity in Italy. Many individuals convinced themselves to overlook one or another of the abuses because they liked some of what Mussolini and the Fascists stood for.
When discussing Fascism, its rise to power, and methods for resisting its return, the entanglement of its major ideas with other political positions must be considered as well. In both Italy and Germany, fascists proved incapable of seizing the state without help and by force (think, for instance, of Hitler’s failed putsch). Fascists and Nazis therefore exploited the democratic process to overturn it. They manipulated (and fostered) a sense of crisis and cast political opponents as enemies of the state to be defeated by any means.We are once again seeing these tactics. US Vice President JD Vance’s recent speech in Europe criticizing the firewall isolating the AfD as anti-democratic reveals a twisting of democratic principles, as he argues political parties must collaborate with what has been classified as an extremist and anti-democratic party. As European states and the US face their own threats of authoritarian backsliding under the guise of popular will, it is worth remembering that while less radical and more traditional sociopolitical groups once believed that they could collaborate with, control, and guide Fascists, the opposite proved true. The entanglement between Fascists and fellow travelers made the regime possible, and rather than reigning in its excesses, they enabled far greater atrocities.
Zane Elward is Assistant Professor at Marian University.
Authoritarianism is Built on Collaboration: How Supporters Enabled and Normalized the Fascist Consolidation of Power